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ABSTRACT
This Article focuses on militarization and weaponization of space. Though there are no authoritative international
definitions of either term, the former refers to ‘the use of outer space by a significant number of military spacecraft’,
while the latter ‘refers to the placing in outer space for any length of time any device designed to attack man-made
targets in outer space and/or in the terrestrial environment.’ Militarization of space occurred many decades ago. The
contemporary concern is weaponization of space; that is, the introduction of new futuristic weapons into the space
environment. The Article argues that the quantum leaps by China’s space program (set to outpace Russia’s cash
strapped program) may herald the dawn of a new Cold War and a heated arms race with the United States as China
seeks to underwrite its regional pre-eminence with military might. The Article highlights the fact that the
international Space Law regime now has a new game in the making for which it is in many ways ill equipped to
handle.

We will engage terrestrial targets someday—ships, airplanes, land targets—from space. We will engage targets in
space, from space. … [The] missions are already assigned, and we’ve written the concepts of operations.1
General Joseph W Ashy, USAF (1996)
[I]f there was ever a threat to our national security [in space], the best—the only—way to solve the problem is to
take weapons into space.2
General Howell M Estes, III USAF (1997)
The Pentagon is so sure that whomever controls space will control the Earth and beyond that they are feverishly
working to deploy anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) that will enable the US to knock out competitors’ ‘eyes in the sky’
during any future hostilities. As the Space Command says in its slick Vision for 2020 brochure, ‘Control of space is
the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others
the use of space if required.’3
Bruce K Gagnon (1999)
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I. INTRODUCTION
The mastery of outer space as the basis of integrated battleground platforms4 is fast becoming a
reality. As the two Gulf Wars and the Kosovo military campaign made clear, space assets are
decisive in battle planning and execution. The contemporary move towards weaponization of
space and its intersection with international law forms the basis of this article. Given the
increasing global reliance on space systems, and increasing militarization of space, its
weaponization and evolution into a distinct theatre of military operations seems likely.5 With the
dawn of the 21st century, the prospect of a celestial war is no idle scenario. Space warfare is the
focus of serious planning as the military planners of major powers brace for new forms of hightech combat. The notion of space warfare has moved from pure science fiction, created in
Hollywood, to realistic planning.6 Though armed conflicts have not occurred in space to date, the
rudimentary means for engaging in such conflicts now exist. This is particularly evident in the
US where the Air Force has recently increased its focus on space—not just how to operate there,
but how to protect operations and attack others in space.7 It has established a new ‘space
operations directorate’ at Air Force Headquarters, opened a new Space Warfare School and
activated two new units: the 76th Space Control Squadron and the 527th Space Aggressor
Squadron.8

4

This concept encapsulates the combination of land, sea and air forces through the use of space assets notably
satellite capabilities to enhance the co-ordination of manpower and facilitation of synergies of firepower. This
includes centralisation of the gathering and processing of intelligence (tracking and identifying military objectives
including troop movements), transmission and dissemination of orders from central command centres to the war
theatre and vice versa and use of Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) to facilitate troop movements and mark targets.
5
See United States Space Command, Vision for 2020 (1997) Federation of American Scientists
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Many may regard combat in space as an extension of air to air ‘dog-fighting’, but the
velocities involved and the nature of the battlefield itself suggest a different set of dynamics.
Major Robert A Ramsey suggests that space combat ought to be viewed sui generis as
fundamentally different from combat in terrestrial airspace, based on the reality that air combat
and space combat ‘are fundamentally different types of combat suggesting different doctrinal
tenets of power’.9 He astutely notes: ‘freed from a strict air warfare paradigm, the effort to
establish limits on space combat in its own right can draw principles of armed conflict from those
applicable to land and sea warfare, as well as from those governing air warfare’.10 This author
concurs with Ramsey’s conclusion that, ‘[w]hile the military use of space has traditionally been
viewed as a medium from which to support terrestrial warfare, including air warfare, space as a
medium of warfare itself raises entirely different legal and operational issues’.11 Considering the
spatial separation of human combatants from their weaponry and the legal analysis of issues
unique to space combat, it is asserted here that space warfare is indeed a stand-alone field of
combat that is not adequately captured by the international regime on the use of force.
At the heart of this Article lies the theme of militarization and weaponization of space.
Though there are no authoritative international definitions of either term, the former refers to ‘the
use of outer space by a significant number of military spacecraft’, while the latter ‘refers to the
placing in outer space for any length of time any device designed to attack man-made targets in
outer space and/or in the terrestrial environment.’12 Militarization of space occurred many
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decades ago.13 The contemporary concern is weaponization of space; that is, the introduction of
weapons into the space environment. This Article seeks to highlight the fact that the international
space law regime14 now has a new game in the making for which it is in many ways ill equipped
to handle.
In Part II the Article discusses the trends towards an arms race in space, noting the
various technological and engineering endeavours geared to this goal. It analyses the efforts
towards militarization and weaponization of outer space in the shadow of international efforts to
push for an exclusive use of outer space for peaceful purposes. It notes the antagonistic domestic
policies (particularly by the United States) to recognise the utility of space within its broad selfdefence concept. Part III focuses on a discussion of the space regime. It adopts a two-prong
analysis on one hand elaborating the entrenchment of international legal instruments to govern
outer space, and exposing their inadequacies and limitations in respect of the weaponization of
space. On the other hand, it carries out a tour de horizon of the efforts of various specialist UN
committees and conferences to secure a consensus to halt weaponization of outer space.
Part IV of the Article notes the maturation of a space enabled integrated battle platform
manifest in the first Gulf War and the paradox of the 1990s—a decade in which significant
technological breakthroughs brought weaponization of the space to the fore and witnessed United
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From the initial conquest of space, both the US and the Soviet Union used space for such military purposes such as
early warning and monitoring of arms control agreements and military reconnaissance.
14
The space regime as it now exists rests upon five multilateral United Nations treaties on outer space: Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature 27 January 1967, 610 UNTS
205 (entered into force 10 October 1967); Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature 22 April 1968, 672 UNTS 119 (entered into
force 3 December 1968); Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for
signature 29 March 1972, 961 UNTS 187 (entered into force 1 September 1972); Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature 14 January 1975, 1023 UNTS 15 (entered into force 15
September 1979); and Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened
for signature 5 December 1979, [1986] ATS 14, annexed to GA Res 34/68, UN GAOR, 34th sess, UN Doc A/34/664
(1979) (entered into force 11 July 1984). These treaties evolved from a series of General Assembly resolutions and
declarations following the creation of the Outer Space Committee in 1959.
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States initiatives to deploy missile defence. Ironically the same decade witnessed robust
initiatives by the two dominant space-powers to limit strategic offensive weaponry through the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I & II). Part VI of the Article argues that the
quantum leaps by China’s space program may herald the dawn of a new Cold War and a heated
arms race with the United States as China seeks to underwrite its regional pre-eminence with
military might. To be a regional hegemony China needs to dominate its own backyard, something
that is leading the United States to increasing seek to contain rather than engage China. Part VII
rounds off the discussion and analysis by casting an eye on the ambivalence of national and
international initiatives and what the future may portend and how existing initiatives may anchor
the mantra of peaceful purposes and curtail the weaponization outer space.

II. THE COLD WAR—A DIFFERENT WAR: NEW IMPERIAL MILITARY
AMBITIONS
The contemporary technological arms race underpinned by strategic offensive weaponry15
commenced in the shadow of World War II with the wartime effort to design and build the first
nuclear weapons. With the discovery of fission in 1939, it became clear to scientists that certain
radioactive materials could be used to make a bomb of unprecedented power.16 On 9 October
1941, then United States President Franklin Roosevelt formally authorised atomic weapon
development,17 heralding the modern development of strategic weaponry. The Manhattan Project
(as the project is popularly known) represented a massive and outstandingly successful
15

In the context of this Article, it means weaponry that has unprecedented power and reach in comparison to
conventional weaponry and is geared to generate massive firepower attacks aimed at the destruction of an array of
infrastructure such as electric power grids, telecommunications, and transportation geared to not only undermine the
opponent’s economic and military capacity but also neutralise its ability to sustain or mount counter-attacks.
Strategic weaponry addresses the deficiencies of first generation modern war dominated by man and fire power.
Strategic weaponry makes use of technology and engineering breakthroughs to deliver awesome massed firepower in
every hit. See eg Thomas X Hammes, ‘Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation’ (2005) 214
Strategic Forum 1, available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss> at 10 February 2006.
16
The Manhattan Project (2006) Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manhattan_Project> at 10 February 2006.
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technological effort.18 After surmounting many scientific, coordination and political problems,
the first ever nuclear test signalling the start of the Atomic Age took place on 16 July 1945.19 A
few weeks later the power of the atomic bomb was unleashed by America on Japan targeting two
of its key cities—Hiroshima and Nagasaki.20
Modern strategic arms limitation efforts generally date back to the aftermath of the
Japanese atomic bombings. In light of the overwhelming destructive potential of nuclear weapons
it was apparent that these weapons caused a threat to humanity and in the event of a nuclear war,
the very survival of humanity. In 1946 the then American representative to the newly formed
United Nations (UN), Bernard Baruch, proposed that nuclear weapons be eliminated.21 In
response, the UN General Assembly set up the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to make
proposals for the peaceful uses of atomic energy and for the elimination of weapons of mass
destruction.
The Commission concentrated debate on the Baruch Plan for an international agency to
control atomic power and weapons but the plan was vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security
Council. The Soviets refusal of this proposition was primarily due to its ongoing efforts to bridge
the technological gap created by the United States’ Manhattan Project. The net result was that the
Commission languished in an impasse for another three years. In 1949, the Soviet Union joined
the nuclear club. With several other major powers accelerating their efforts to develop atomic
bombs, the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons generated sufficient concern helping break
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the impasse at the AEC. This led to several initiatives aimed at limiting various aspects of nuclear
weaponry.22
Amidst the initiatives to curtail nuclear proliferation, in October 1954, the Committee for
the International Geophysical Year (IGY) recommended that its member countries should
consider launching artificial satellites for scientific space exploration. Emphasis was placed on
satellites to measure the characteristics of the unknown space environment with scientists seeking
to lay foundations for satellites to serve different purposes including communication, weather and
navigation. These calls provided an enormous stimulus for further research on artificial satellites
by the United States and the Soviet Union.
Three years later, the Soviet Union brought the Space Age to life with the launch of
Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite.23 Despite the overarching principle of the use of outer space
for peaceful purposes, the military advantages offered by outer space were hard to resist once the
United States and Soviet Union had succeeded in placing satellites in orbit. Though the earliest
satellite programs focused on communications, weather intelligence and navigation aid; almost
simultaneously and indeed as an outgrowth both the United States and Soviet Union began
exploring missile warning systems to monitor the launch of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs).24 It was not lost on the two space faring powers that space assets would in the near
future be indispensable to combat operations.25 The international community was quick to note
this changing mindset and generated rhetoric that states should use outer space for positive and
peaceful purposes in an effort to ensure a pro-active rather than the reactive stance which had
dominated atomic weaponry.
22

The first productive treaty to come out of this committee came in 1957 with the signing by the US and Russia of
an agreement to demilitarise Antarctica and to ban testing of nuclear devices there.
23
On 31 January 1958 the United States of America joined the Space Age with the Launch of Explorer 1.
24
Curtis Peebles, High Frontier: The US Air Force and the Military Space Program (1997) 33.
25
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In 1957 the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1148 dealing with the topic of
disarmament which declared that ‘the sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively
for peaceful and scientific purposes.’26 In the following year, UN General Assembly Resolution
1348 recognised that the common aim of humankind was that outer space was to be used ‘for
peaceful purposes only.’27 The United States and Soviet Union obliged with the United States
adopting the view that ‘“peaceful” in relation to outer space activities was interpreted…to mean
“non-aggressive” rather than non-military… By contrast, the Soviet Union publicly took the
view, despite its own military uses of space, that “peaceful” meant “non-military” and that in
consequence all military activities in outer space were “non-peaceful” and possibly illegal.’28
Leading by example, the United States passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act in
1958.29 In line with general international sentiment on the necessity of the use of space for
‘peaceful purposes’, the Act asserted that ‘activities in space should be devoted to peaceful
purposes for the benefit of all mankind’.30 The Act established the ‘foundation for United States
policy in the development of international space law and serve[d] as a parallel to the international
policies established through the United Nations’.31 Although Congress adopted the ‘peaceful
purposes for the benefit of all mankind’ standard for space activities and placed these activities
under the auspices of NASA, Congress also carved out a national defence exception to handle
certain military activities.32
26

Regulation, Limitation and Blanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments; Conclusion of an
International Convention (Treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen and
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In 1961, with a quantum leap in space technology, humankind’s determination to reach
the heavens came to fruition when the Soviet Union launched the first manned spaceflight,
placing Yuri Gagarin into orbit. The United States followed suit in 1962. This marked the start of
a technological space race between the United States and the Soviet Union with each seeking to
assert dominance in space exploration providing the genesis of a competition which would soon
metamorphose into an arms race. The history of the militarization and weaponization of space
goes back to this period.
In the 1960s several air-launched Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT) systems were tested by
the United States and Soviet Union as a counter weight to each other’s development of strategic
air-launched and satellite-dependent ballistic missiles. Early experiments focused on ‘hard-kill
weapons’ involving experimentation in kinetic energy weapons—a form of hypervelocity
weapon.33 In the same period, study also commenced on laser weapons—Directed Energy
Weapons capable of disabling satellites.34 It was clear, at least theoretically then that lasers and
ASATs with the capability to target space assets stood to radically change warfare if ever
fielded.35 The research was to span many decades with tremendous technical problems being
gradually resolved.

[A]ctivities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military
operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and development necessary to make
effective provision for the defense of the United States) shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed
by, the Department of Defense.
33

The most common version of this was the ASAT designed for use against artificial satellites. These are ‘hard kill’
weapons that shatter their target through high-speed impact owing to the tremendous speeds at which these objects
travel in orbit in low-earth orbit which generate kinetic energy sufficient to obliterate targets: Vlasic, above n 12,
397–8.
34
‘Laser’ is an acronym for Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation, a device that produces a
narrow beam of radiation by means of a physical emission. The intense beams can be used to either physically harm
the satellite or simply to ‘blind’ the satellite sensors. For a concise discussion, see Major William Spacy II, Does the
United
States
Need
Space–Based
Weapons?
(1999)
Maxwell–Gunter
Air
Force
Base
<http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/CADRE_Papers/PDF_Bin/spacy.pdf> at 23 October 2005, 10.
35
Ramey, above n 9, 23, 25.
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The international community continued to maintain the view that outer space should be
used for ‘peaceful’ purposes. However, the disagreement was whether this meant ‘non-military’
or ‘non-aggressive uses’, especially considering the fact that the then dominant players—the two
superpowers—were actively engaged in harnessing the military utility offered by space and were
thus averse to a strict definition. While talk of ‘peace’ increased, so did the military potential of
space technology. With this in mind, the United States’ interpretation of the word ‘peaceful’ was
created.36 The official position of the United States has been and still remains that ‘peaceful’
means ‘non-aggressive’ and not ‘non-military’.37 The Soviet Union held an opposite view that
military activities in the space environment cannot be and are not peaceful.38 The Soviet
proposal, banning the use of outer space for military purposes, equated peaceful use with nonmilitary use.39 While both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to defend their
positions, the truth of the matter was that neither country wanted a final definition to be accepted
by all states.40 Such an ultimate conclusion would limit both countries’ future use of outer
space.41
As the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union heated up,
the military utility space offered continued to fuel intense research and development of state-ofthe-art technology to capitalise on the military utility of outer space. By the 1970s, the Soviet
Union had succeeded in developing an explosive kill vehicle with the ability to be ‘hoisted’ into
the same orbital plane as a target satellite. In addition, development of electromagnetic and

36

See Bin Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997) 515.
Ibid.
38
Carl Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space (1982) 22.
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Ibid 516.
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As Menon states, ‘[s]ince an all-pervasive, acceptable, objective criteria defining peaceful uses have never been
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reflect the self interests of the party making the determination’: P K Menon, The United Nations’ Efforts to Outlaw
the Arms Race in Outer Space (1988) Chapter 3.
37
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radiation weapons with the capacity to impair electronic circuitry by the creation and/or emission
of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) was actively underway and yielding exciting results.
Technological breakthroughs were turning scientific dreams into military utility.42 The US on the
other hand was experimenting with ‘Microsats’—small non-kinetic devices borne on a Space
Operated Vehicle (SOV) that could be used to disable or disrupt rather than to destroy enemy
satellites when released in outer space. Military planners were soon diversifying their vision to
encompass development of military space plane technologies and a viable military space plane
base.43
In 1978, in an effort to clarify policy for space activities in light of technological
advances, the Carter administration ordered the National Security Council Policy Review
Committee to review existing space policy and develop guidelines for space activities.44 The
resulting Presidential Directive provided that the United States would continue to advance the
dual goals of international cooperation and national defence. On one hand, the principles
championed peaceful uses of outer space, asserting the United States’ commitment to the
exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and the centrality of
scientific and economic imperatives, while on the other asserting the utility of space as a
component of its national defence.45
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In 1980, with Jimmy Carter out of office, Ronald Reagan became the new occupant of the
White House. When Reagan came into office, détente was the policy of the day.46 Reagan
abandoned détente and made no secret of the fact that he considered the Soviet Union to be an
‘evil empire’. Under Reagan, a significant shift in space policy was to take place. In 1981, the
first year of the Reagan presidency, the new administration initiated a comprehensive space
policy review, geared towards exploring ways of generating a United States military capacity to
weaponize space. On 23 March 1983, Reagan launched the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).
The SDI was a system geared to use space-based systems to protect the US from attack by
strategic nuclear missiles.
The SDI provided a measure of legitimacy to many ideas that were formerly seen as
impossible. An arms race in outer space now meant something more—the introduction of new,
futuristic weapons, including beam, kinetic, electronic, and laser weapons, into the space
environment. With the SDI in place and Reagan’s militaristic mindset, billions of dollars were
splashed on various military projects, mainly innovative technologies to bolster the military
might of the United States. Instead of cooperating with the Soviets, Reagan was dedicated to
strengthening US military might and also determined to force the Soviets to match America’s
massive military budget. The initiative aimed at developing and introducing futuristic weapons
into the space environment to assert United States military and technological supremacy over the
Soviet Union.
There was considerable debate over the necessity, feasibility, and cost-effectiveness of the
weapons envisaged under the SDI. Nevertheless, the huge military expenditure did finally pay
46

Détente is French for relaxation. Generally, it may be applied to any international situation where previously
hostile nations not involved in an open war ‘warm up’ to each other and threats de-escalate. However, today in
international parlance, it has come primarily to refer to a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union
and the United States and a weakening of the Cold War, occurring from the late until the start of the 1980s: Détente
(2005) Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Detente> at 26 September 2005.
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dividends. Among its major successes was the flight on 13 September 1985 by United States Air
Force pilot Major Doug Pearson. He made military history when he successfully displayed the
capabilities of ASAT weapons. Flying an F-15A at one and half times the speed of sound, he
launched a missile which kinetically destroyed a practice target satellite, reducing to it space
debris.47 Pearson’s feat provided credence to, as well as a propaganda base for, the Reagan
administration’s ‘Star Wars’ vision, signalling a new phase in the arms race in outer space. The
successful flight provided just the sort of evidence that proponents of the weaponization of space
needed. It was evident that a robust, well-funded space program would be able to develop
workable technologies. What had been regarded generally as science fiction four decades earlier
was rapidly moving to the realm of military reality through the harnessing of technology and
innovative engineering, buttressed by tens of millions of dollars in research and development
funds.
By 1989, the Reagan policy of ‘ASAT and EMP deterrence’, and the corresponding goal
of developing and deploying an anti-satellite capability were reaffirmed and entrenched as part of
US military policy with the introduction of National Space Policy Directive No 1 (NSPD 1) in
1989. The Directive stated:

The United States will conduct those activities in space that are necessary to national defense. Space
activities will contribute to national security objectives by (1) deterring, or if necessary, defending against
enemy attack; (2) assuring that forces of hostile nations cannot prevent our own use of space; (3) negating,
if necessary, hostile space systems; and (4) enhancing operations of United States and Allied forces.

47
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III. THE SPACE LAW REGIME: A PATCHY FRAMEWORK AND LEAKY LEGAL
PLATFORM?

A. Steps Forward? Disciplining Space Endeavours through International Law
As noted in Part II of the Article, in the early days of man’s ascent into space, the
majority of the international community failed to agree on whether ‘peaceful’ meant ‘nonmilitary’. It was amidst this background of disagreement that the space resolution—the
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing State Activity in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space (Declaration of Principles)—was adopted in late 1963 by the United Nations General
Assembly.48 In many regards, it was the ‘first significant step in the development of space law’.49
As Ramey notes, ‘[t]hough not binding on any State, the Resolution does not read like a
traditional resolution. It declares and announces legal principles instead of merely recommending
a course of action.’50
In the same year that the Declaration on Legal Principles was adopted, the Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty)
entered into force to address the contested and controversial issue of nuclear detonations in
space.51 The Treaty primarily aimed to limit nuclear weapons testing but was also a reaction to
Soviet pleas that nuclear detonations posed a danger to the safety of its cosmonauts. The US had
responded to the Soviet concern with the assurance ‘that no activities were contemplated which
could have harmful effects upon the Soviet spacemen’, however the international community felt

48

Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, GA
Res 1962, UN GAOR, 18th sess, UN Doc A/5515 (1963).
49
Ramey, above n 9.
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51
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it imperative that nuclear detonations be totally banned.52 With the entry into force of the treaty,
nuclear detonations in space were no longer lawful.
The year 1967 also yielded a very significant treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).53 So prominent and significant is this treaty that it has
often been referred to as ‘the constitution of outer space’.54 It represents ‘the primary basis for
legal order in the space environment’55 and has been termed the ‘Magna Carta of outer space
law’.56 The major principles governing activities in space are presented in articles 1, 2 and 3 of
the Outer Space Treaty. Article 1 states that activities in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, shall be conducted for the benefit of all countries and that outer space shall
be part of the heritage of all mankind.57 It also provides for freedom of scientific investigation in
outer space and for international cooperation in such investigation.58 Article 2 provides that
nations cannot appropriate outer space by claim of sovereignty.59 Article 3 provides that states
parties to the Treaty are to conduct their activities in space in accordance with international law,
the United Nations Charter, and in the interest of international peace, security, cooperation and
understanding.60
Of significance with regard to the use of force is article 3’s reference to article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations and, particularly its express preservation of the right of states to
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use space in self-defence. Though the UN Charter forbids the ‘threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations’,61 the meaning of this prohibition remains hotly
contested. As early as 1962, in an address to the UN General Assembly, then US Senator Al Gore
proclaimed that the established rule of ‘peaceful purposes’ includes the right of a state to selfdefence.

It is the view of the U.S. that outer space should be used only for peaceful—that is nonaggressive and
beneficial—purposes. The question of military activities in space cannot be divorced from the question of
military activities on earth. To banish these activities in both environments we must continue our efforts
for general and complete disarmament with adequate safeguards. Until this is achieved, the test of any
space activity must not be whether it is military or non-military, but whether or not it is consistent with the
U.N. Charter and other obligations of law.62

Whatever definition one gives to the concept of ‘self-defence’, the ultimate test of
whether an action is legitimate self-defence is the approval of the UN Security Council rather
than the opinion of each individual nation asserting such a right.63 However, it is significant that
many of the military initiatives in space by the space-faring nations have failed to elicit robust
condemnations, despite constant debate and proclamations by the United Nations cautioning
against an arms-race up yonder. In light of the fact that neither the UN nor the vast majority of its
member states have protested these unilateral efforts, it would seem that there is a tacit
imprimatur of approval. Turning to article 4, it provides in part:

The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for
peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any
type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of
military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The
61
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use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies
shall also not be prohibited.64

It is arguable whether the use of the adjective ‘exclusively’ in the article has any
meaningful purposes in view of the express approval that ‘[t]he use of military personnel for
scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited’. The reality is that
most civilian applications are dual use and readily lend themselves to military utility. Secondly,
the use of the word ‘purpose’ in article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty ‘brings in the notions of both
intent and of consequences; the activity must not be designed to terminate in some use of force
contrary to international law.’65 There is no indication that the Outer Space Treaty’s drafters
intended the term ‘purpose’ to have any ‘special meaning’. ‘Purpose’ is generally defined as ‘an
intended or desired result; end, aim; goal’.66 By this reasoning, for example, the ‘Star Wars’
program which never came to fruition would be held to be a peaceful use as its stated purpose
was to defend the US, a peaceful ‘purpose’. That would equally mean that the ‘Son of Star Wars’
program falls in this parameter. The problem persists since weapons that are placed for defensive
purposes can just as easily have offensive utility. The big question then becomes ‘does the Outer
Space Treaty incorporate a “rightful intent” test?’67
Besides the Outer Space Treaty, another set of rules was developed in the early 1970s,
when détente cooled down the heated arms race, opening a new window of opportunity for the
superpowers. This led to the signing of two significant treaties—the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABM Treaty)68 and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Treaty.69 Both these
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treaties tacitly recognise the legality of reconnaissance satellites as a means of verifying treaty
compliance, and prohibit any ‘interference’ with their function.70 The provisions are no surprise
since consensus was that positive activities in space included, but were not limited to, the use of
military satellites to monitor the performance of arms-control agreements. Two primary
provisions of the ABM Treaty have a direct bearing on the weaponization of space — articles 5
and 12.
Article 5(1) provides that ‘[e]ach party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM
systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based’.71
Though there were no space-based ABM systems in existence in 1972 when the treaty was
adopted, the space program of each Party was highly advanced and each could foresee the use of
space-based ABM systems.72 Article 12 is perhaps even more significant to the long-term use of
space by military systems beyond the narrower question of ABM systems:

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party
shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other
Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.73

Paragraph 1 is significant. Though the legality of military surveillance activity from space
was established in international law prior to the ABM Treaty, the treaty gave formal sanction to
the practice by the two leading space-faring states. In particular, it acknowledged the legality of
space-based surveillance via satellite and entrenched this as ‘an essential component of the
69
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international arms control regime’.74 Thus, while the term ‘peaceful’ is contained in all UN
documents devoted to outer space matters, Richard A Morgan notes that most experts agree that
the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit ‘military use’ of space.75 He goes on to note that there is
a ‘consensus, within the United Nations that “peaceful” more specifically equates to “nonaggressive”.’76 However, the problem of identifying the exact parameters and interpretation of
the term ‘peaceful’ in regard to the space law regime, and hence the interpretation to be accorded
to the ABM Treaty and SALT Treaty, still persists in view of the fact that the general stance by
commentators is at odds with the Conference on Disarmament’s assertion in 1986 that ‘[n]o
country should develop, test or deploy space weapons in any form’.77 Alex Meyer offers a robust
defence of this position, noting:

[a]ny use of space which does not itself constitute an attack upon, or stress against, the territorial integrity
and independence of another State, would be ‘permissible.’ Military manoeuvres in peacetime, the issue of
reconnaissance satellites, the testing of weapons, the establishment of military Orbiting Laboratories
(MOLs), etc., would therefore be also permissible in Outer Space. These activities belong to the so-called
‘peaceful military activities’.78

From the foregoing discussion of the central treaties comprising the space law regime, it
is readily apparent that despite the use for peaceful purposes centrepiece of the space law regime,
key provisions readily lend themselves to interpretations that would support many aspects of
militarization and weaponization of space. The matter is thus open and dependent on the
perspective a state adopts, since the standard can be stretched and this elastic nature allows the
space law regime to fit a ‘for and against’ interpretation. Supporters of the militarization theory
74
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rely on a fundamental axiom of international law: ‘If an act is not specifically prohibited, then
international law permits it’.79 Professor N M Matte sums up the patchy nature of the space law
regime by noting that the regime, which includes the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space
Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Moon Agreement, was developed to ‘permit,
indeed to endorse, the arms race, including the militarization of space’.80

B. Musical Chairs? UN Efforts to Build a Consensual Policy on Disarmament in Outer
Space
In the 1980s, in the face of the Reagan administration’s ambitious space militarization and
weaponization vision, the United Nations was working to address the matter in a bid to head off
the space arms race between the two superpowers. Ironically, it was the Soviet Union which
introduced a robust plan to prevent an arms race in outer space into the agenda of the thirty-sixth
General Assembly in the fall of 1981.81 It was a bold plan which proposed the conclusion of a
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space.82 In
response, the General Assembly expressed its view that it ‘considered it necessary to take
effective steps, by concluding an appropriate international treaty, to prevent the spread of the
arms race to outer space.’83 It also requested that the Conference on Disarmament begin
negotiations to achieve agreement on the text of such a treaty.84 The following year, in its
provisional agenda, the General Assembly reaffirmed its view that outer space ‘should be used
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exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it should not become an arena for an arms race.’85 It
went on to link peaceful uses of space with the good of general and complete disarmament.86
In 1982, the United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (UNISPACE 82) convened in Vienna, Austria.87 The Conference ‘was born out of a desire
to explore how the worldwide activities in outer space, including international cooperation, could
be developed to ensure that the potential benefits from space science, technology and their
applications would be truly realized for all countries.’88 With regard to the military use of outer
space, UNISPACE 82 came up with some tangible recommendations. However, its attempts to
introduce language banning the testing and deployment of ASATs and guaranteeing the
inviolability of all peaceful space activities failed.89 It did however reaffirm the goal of
preventing an arms race in outer space and recommended that the United Nations bodies give
priority to the issue of weapons in space. In relation to military use of outer space, the Conference
made a number of recommendations key among which were:




The extension of an arms race into outer space is a matter of grave concern to the international community,
detrimental to humanity and should be prevented.
The maintenance of peace and security in outer space is of great importance for international peace and
security and the prevention of an arms race and hostilities in outer space is essential.90

In its report issued at the end of its 1985 session, the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) acknowledged the differing viewpoints by member
states as to the extent to which the Committee could engage in substantive work toward the
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peaceful maintenance of outer space.91 Some delegations wanted COPUOS to consider specific
steps to ensure that the uses of space remained peaceful.92 Three years later, in 1988 the General
Assembly passed a resolution supporting general and complete disarmament under effective
international control.93 Resolution 43/70 stated that in order for disarmament to take place, outer
space must be used for peaceful purposes and must not become an arena for a new arms race.94
‘The General Assembly recognized the need to consolidate, reinforce, and enhance the legal
regime in outer space, and to provide effective verification measures. The vote on the resolution
was 154 to 1: the United States cast the single negative vote.’95
In 1989, the prevention of an arms race in outer space was once again at the heart of the
deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament composed of both developed and developing
world countries when it convened for its 520th plenary meeting. Delegates called for the
prevention of an arms race in outer space. The general sentiments of the meeting are captured in
Indian Ambassador Sharma’s declaration that:

[I]t is accepted that an extension of the arms race into outer space would have profoundly destabilizing
consequences. Deeply conscious of such risks, an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the
United Nations have in recent years urged the Conference on Disarmament to take resolute measures
aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.96

However the differing viewpoints among some members and the political shadow cast by
the reluctant superpowers prevented any definitive agenda emerging in relation to preventing
weaponization of outer space, something which may perhaps have put a brake on the Reagan
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administration's ‘Star Wars’ vision and thrown cold water on Soviet determination to match and
counter the Reagan administration’s ambitious program.
In 1990, in the face of an ascendant and bellicose United States the UN General Assembly
felt obliged to identify the legal deficit in the Space Law regime with regard to militarization and
weaponization of the Space environment. The General Assembly stated that, ‘[T]he legal regime
applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer
space, that this legal regime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that
environment, [and expressed] the need to consolidate and reinforce that regime, ... enhance its
effectiveness, and [emphasized] the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements,
both bilateral and multilateral.’97 In addition, the General Assembly recognised the fact that
statements were not sufficient to prevent an arms race and emphasised additional measures ‘with
appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space’ must
be adopted by the community of nations.98 The resolution called upon the major space faring
states to ‘contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space’ and to ‘take
immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.’99
Despite the rhetoric at the United Nations, the move by the United States to ensure
effective global power projection through space supremacy received added urgency in the same
year when the first Gulf War broke out. The war demonstrated technically and militarily the
multiplier effects that space technology would have on military capabilities.
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V. THE GULF WAR—A WATERSHED: INTEGRATED BATTLE PLATFORMS COME
OF AGE
The first Gulf War was the first war to rely heavily on space technology and the first to
demonstrate that an integrated battle platform, coordinated through space assets, would contribute
tremendously to battleground supremacy. The war demonstrated that, ‘[a]s with other military
operations, space operations [were] shedding the old strategic Cold War myopia and focusing
instead on theatre war.’100 The experience of the first Gulf War, in which the multinational force
suffered light casualties despite facing a supposedly battle-hardened Iraqi Army, and the role that
technology played in enabling the multinational force to control the battlefield (despite facing
being vastly outnumbered by the Iraqi army) buoyed US determination to enhance its military
capabilities through technology. The heavy reliance on space technology convinced the US
military that space dominance and space control were necessary. B K Gagnon sums up the
technologically-driven and dominated first Gulf War thus:

[T]he war was essentially an opportunity to test new weapons systems. Afterward, Pentagon
spokespersons predicted that if other enemies could be prevented from gaining access to military space
assets, the US could dominate any battlefield situation. An urgent call went out for anti-satellite weapons
that could knock out competitors’ eyes and ears. Less than a decade later, the war in Kosovo was used to
show the world that the goal [had] been achieved.101

Speaking on the experience and lessons of the first Gulf War, General Colin Powell, then
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that the United States ought to ‘achieve total control
of space if [it is] to succeed on the modern battlefield.’102 On 19 June 1992, space was finally
proposed to be included in the United States Air Force mission statement.103 About two years
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later, in April 1994, General Horner, the Commander in Chief of US Space Command
(USSPACECOM), testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserted that theatre
missile defence was the United States’ ‘top priority’.104 The net result in subsequent years was to
spur the United States to aggressively pursue research and development of innovative space
weapons. In particular, the United States pursued research into the development of Space
Operated Vehicles (SOVs) with the capability of delivering and deploying ordnances from space
through low-earth orbit (LEO), geo-synchronous orbit (GEO) or sun-synchronous orbit (SSO).
Since then, under the direction of the United States National Command Authority (NCA), the US
has directed the use of military power through new force projection systems to strike targets in
other countries during Operations Other Than War (OOTW).105
Technological breakthroughs in the 1990s brought to the fore the fact that the heavens
would not only be conquered but ruled. While the Clinton administration had advocated a robust
space policy, the administration was disinclined towards heavy military spending on the
initiatives. In 2001, Clinton exited the White House and George Bush Jr. took over the reins. The
White House now had another bellicose, hard-line Republican occupant who, like Reagan in the
1980s, was convinced that America’s pre-eminent status as a superpower must be underwritten
by military might. This entailed a need to not only maintain America’s supremacy but to eclipse
every other nation. Shrugging the protests of the international community, the Bush Jr.
administration dusted off Reagan’s SDI and brought it back to play with the embrace of the socalled ‘Son of Star Wars’. Tens of millions of dollars were soon being pumped into new defence
initiatives. This huge expenditure was buoyed further by a January 2001 report to Congress by
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the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and Organization, chaired
by Donald Rumsfeld (Rumsfeld Commission).
In its report, the Commission warned that the 600 satellites upon which the US military
depends for photo reconnaissance, targeting, communications, weather forecasting, early warning
and intelligence gathering were highly vulnerable to attack from adversaries.106 The report went
on to warn that the US must anticipate what Pentagon officials called a ‘Space Pearl Harbour’—a
crippling sneak attack against American satellites orbiting the planet.107 To reduce the nation’s
vulnerability, the Rumsfeld Commission urged the US to develop ‘superior space capabilities’,
including the ability to ‘negate the hostile use of space against US interests’ by using ‘power
projection in, from and through space’.108 Rumsfield noted that in history every medium—air,
land and sea—had seen conflict. In essence, contemporary reality indicates that space will be no
different. The report from his Commission rounded off by calling space warfare ‘a virtual
certainty’.109

The Other Side of the Coin: Redemption with Sin—Arms (Un)limitation
In the 1990s, two key treaties (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I & II—START I &
START II) were negotiated between the United States and Russia to serve aimed at reducing the
United States’ and Russia’s stockpiles of nuclear arsenals. Although the ABM Treaty set out
initial limitations on the use of strategic arms, START I was the first treaty to actually reduce the
number of strategic offensive weapons, resulting in overall reductions of thirty to forty percent.110
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START I brought about a reduction in both the United States’ and Russia’s nuclear warheads
arsenal.111 United States President George H W Bush Sr. and Soviet Union President Mikhail
Gorbachev signed the START I Treaty in Moscow in July of 1991.112 It was ratified by both
countries in December 1994. 113
As the START I Treaty was coming into force, negotiations were being finalised for the
START II Treaty. The START II Treaty was designed to reduce the United States and Russian
arsenal of strategic nuclear warheads and eliminate the most destabilising strategic weapons:
heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs. This
treaty was geared to build upon the START I Treaty and have greater reductions in strategic
nuclear forces.114 Although the START II Treaty was designed to build upon the START I
Treaty, it was never legally enacted and thus never gained legal binding force.115
The United States approved the initial START II Treaty in 1996,116 but the Russian Duma
refused to ratify it.117 Russian officials then attempted to amend the START II Treaty in 1997.118
The Protocol to the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
included a memorandum of understanding linking ratification of the START II Treaty to the
United States’ continued adherence to the ABM Treaty. On 4 May 2000, Russia ratified the
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START II Treaty along with the 1997 Protocol; however, the United States never ratified the
Treaty because it did not approve of the 1997 Protocol.119
As START negotiations dominated United States and Russian foreign military policy, the
United States Congress was dominated by activity concerning the ABM Treaty—ironically its
termination rather than strengthening. The Patriot batteries deployed during the Persian Gulf War
helped make a case for the role of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).120 The duel between United
States Patriot missile batteries and Iraqi SCUD theatre ballistic missiles during the 1991 Persian
Gulf War brought TMD to the attention of the US Congress. Pressure began building in the
United States to either loosen or completely divest United States antiballistic missile technology
from the constraints of the ABM Treaty. On 5 December 1991 passed the Missile Defence Act of
1991.121 This act put Congress on record as officially supporting a National Missile Defence
(NMD) program, stating that: ‘It is a goal of the United States to deploy an anti-ballistic missile
system, including one or an adequate additional number of anti-ballistic missile sites and spacebased sensors, that is capable of providing a highly effective defence of the United States against
limited attacks of ballistic missiles.’122
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Four years later, a bill was introduced in the United States Congress entitled the Defend
America Act of 1995,123 which would require the President within 180 days after enactment to
serve notice that the United States intends to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. This legislation
(which later failed) was directed toward remedying the lack of defence against ballistic missile
attack. Section 4 provided within one year after enactment for at least one test of either an ABM
interceptor based in space; a sensor in space capable of providing data directly to an ABM
interceptor; or an existing air defence, theatre missile defence, or early warning system to
demonstrate its capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight
trajectory. In the same year, the Ballistic Missile Defense Act of was proposed.124 The Bill
approached ballistic missile defences by repealing the Missile Defense Act of 1991.125 It then
substantially reformulated the initial statement of United States policy on NMD. The proposed
system included space-based sensors, including the Space and Missile Tracking System (formerly
known as Brilliant Eyes), and other space-based sensors which could provide cueing to the
ground-based interceptors.126 The Bill also called for the NMD system to be developed for
deployment, with an initial operational capability being achieved by 2003.127 On 3 January 1996,
President Clinton vetoed the Bill owing to the fact that the proposed NMD would not be
accommodated within the existing ABM Treaty.128 This however wasn’t an outright veto on the
program itself.129 In 2001, Bill Clinton was replaced by George Bush Jr. Shortly into his first
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term, on 14 December 2001 Bush dropped a bombshell when he announced the withdrawal of the
United States’ from the ABM Treaty.130 Among the key reasons he gave was that the Treaty was
outdated and with the Cold War over, the United States had a new set of defence priorities.131 The
most significant and alarming consequence of the withdrawal in the author’s view is that it gives
the United States a free run to develop weapon systems and in particular space based sensors and
interceptors prohibited under the ABM Treaty, and thus creates yet another significant loophole
in the space legal framework owing to the dual use technology to which ABM missiles can be
adapted to.

VI. WRESTLING FOR SPACE SUPERIORITY (A NEW COLD WAR?): MUCH TO BE
GAINED, LITTLE TO BE LOST—THE BATTLE OF THE TITANS
In the 21st Century, the United States is preparing its next military objective—a doctrine
to establish ‘space superiority’.132 Noting the experience of Iraqi Freedom in 2003 in which Iraqi
deployed GPS jammers the United States is wary that adversaries will target its space capabilities
in an attempt to deny that combat advantage. Space superiority ensures the freedom to operate in
the space medium while denying the same to an adversary and, like air superiority, cannot be
taken for granted.133 The new doctrine means that pre–emptive strikes against enemy satellites
would become ‘crucial steps in any military operation’.134 The USAF believes that seizing
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control of the ‘final frontier’ is essential for modern warfare, noting that ‘[s]pace superiority
provides freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack. Space and air superiority is now
deemed crucial in any military operation’.135 In this regard the concept of counter space
operations has been articulated premised on the notion of destroying enemy satellites in the event
of combat to improve the chance of victory.136
Space superiority will be gained and maintained through counter space operations which
is anchored in The US Air Force’s air and space power functions. The development of offensive
counter space capabilities provides combatant commanders with new tools for counter space
operations. Counter space operations have defensive and offensive elements, both of which
depend on robust space situation awareness. These operations may be utilised throughout the
spectrum of conflict and may achieve a variety of effects from temporary denial to complete
destruction of the adversary’s space capability.137 With China ascendant in the 21st century spacetechnology rivalry between the United States and China is heating up. In 2000 China’s unveiled
an ambitious ten-year space program whose objectives include:






To build up an integrated Chinese military and civilian earth observation system.
To set up an independently operated indigenously-built satellite broadcasting and
telecommunications system. The technology would be used to develop new military and civilian
communications satellites to form a command-and-control network designed to link Chinese
combat forces.
To establish an independent Chinese satellite navigation and positioning system. This would be
achieved by launching a satellite constellation in stages while developing the relevant application
systems.138
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While one of the strongest immediate motivations for this program appears to be political
prestige, China’s space efforts almost certainly will contribute to improved military space
systems.139 In 2003, Huang Chunping, commander of the Long March 2-F carrier rocket team
and deputy commander of the Jiuquan space launch centre noted: ‘Just imagine there are outer
space facilities of another country at the place very, very high above your head, and so others
clearly see what you are doing, and what you are feeling…That’s why we also need to develop
space technology.’140 Like the United States, China is researching technology designed to disable
or destroy satellites, and is developing a dual-use satellite launch vehicle that is capable of
‘blinding’ or destroying satellites in orbit as well as technology that can be used in areas such as
missile guidance systems.141
In 2003 the Chinese People’s Daily quoted a Chinese military strategist as saying. ‘In the
current and future state security strategy, if one wants not to be controlled by others, one must
have considerable space scientific and technological strength.’142 Later, a Chinese military
official commented that China’s army had already introduced the concept of ‘space force
strength’143 in apparent reference to a similar US military concept (noted above in this Part of the
Article). The official went on to note that a Chinese military research report proposed building a
separate ‘force to fight in space’.
China is rising peacefully at the moment but nationalism is an important force, and there
are serious grievances regarding external issues, notably Taiwan. There are inevitable frictions
with the United States as China’s regional role increases and its ‘sphere of influence’ develops. It
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is likely that China is inching towards adopting the United States stance—underwriting its
regional pre-eminence with military might.144 Professor John J Mearsheimer observes that to
predict the future in Asia, one needs to note how rising powers are likely to act and how other
states will react to them. In a crisp, incisive analysis he postulates:

The international system has several defining characteristics. The main actors are states that operate in
anarchy—which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. All great powers have some
offensive military capability, which means that they can hurt each other. Finally, no state can know the
future intentions of other states with certainty. The best way to survive in such a system is to be as
powerful as possible, relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another
state will attack it.145

China’s intent seems to be to eclipse any peer competitor in Asia and thus dominate Asia
the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. In another robust insight,
Mearsheimer notes ‘…China will strive to maximize the power gap between itself and its
neighbors, especially Japan and Russia, and to ensure that no state in Asia can threaten it.’146 This
path has lots of rewards to offer not least that gaining regional hegemony is probably the only
way that China will get back Taiwan. However, American policymakers are unlikely to sit on
their hands and watch this unfold, and in all likelihood as the world’s sole superpower will seek
to contain China much in the same way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
At present, the United States is spending more on Missile Defense than on conventional
counterforce and related capabilities dedicated to attacking theatre missiles on the ground before
they are launched. In part, this allocation of resources reflects the abundance of weapons,
platforms and sensors that can be applied to attacking theatre missiles and launchers, in addition
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to the full spectrum of other ground targets. Once the United States deploys an effective BMD
system, minimal deterrent capability posed by other major powers could be negated unless their
missile arsenals are sufficiently improved in numbers and accuracy, and by fitting its ICBMs
with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs)—weapons long at the centre
of the former US-Soviet Cold War arms race and the subject of key bilateral disarmament treaties
including the ABM Treaty, SALT I and II and START I and II. This American initiative is
fuelling a new arms race. Having abrogated the ABM Treaty in 2001, American policy makers
declared that mounting non-nuclear warheads on intercontinental strategic missiles would give
the option of striking a target anywhere on Earth within about 30 minutes and with a large
element of surprise, since there is no reliance on easily detectable ships or aircraft.147 In 2006, the
Kremlin voiced worry over US plans to mount non-nuclear warheads on intercontinental strategic
missiles to strike targets anywhere in the world within minutes and with no prior warning and
called for talks on subject.148
The American initiatives have raised hackles in China with its military strategists
developing a concept of limited deterrence.149 Limited deterrence rests on a limited war–fighting
capability aimed at communicating China’s ability to inflict costly damage on the adversary at
every rung on the escalation ladder and thus denying the adversary victory in the event of a war.
Limited deterrence requires hitting counterforce targets that are mobile. These forces would thus
require effective space–based early warning, and some configuration of Ballistic Missile Defence
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capabilities. Given that China does not now have such capabilities, the straight–line prediction
would be that over the next decade or so, we should expect to see a discernible effort to shift the
forces away from a minimum strike–back assured destruction posture, which China now has,
toward limited war–fighting.150
China has made quantum steps to realise its space dream in a relatively short span of time.
Sino-Russian space cooperation has strengthened as a cash-strapped Russia increasingly offers
technological expertise to a cashed up China. This is likely to continue in the coming years as
China moves toward lunar and deep space explorations and the next phases of manned space
program. On the other hand, Sino-U.S. space cooperation has not been overly amicable. Though
in 1995, the two countries signed a commercial space launch agreement whereby the U.S.
government would grant export licenses for American-made satellites to be launched on Chinese
rockets, Washington remained concerned over Chinese access to space technologies with military
applications that could improve its missile systems. The program was effectively suspended in
2002 in the wake of the Loral/Hughes investigation and the release of the Cox Report that
alleged, among other things, that the Chinese were using international space cooperation to
enhance its military space capabilities.151
The implementation of the ambitious Chinese space plan creates a situation between the
United States and China resembling the Cold War. Allegations of Chinese theft of American
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technology through espionage, security crackdowns and spy hunts are strongly reminiscent of the
early 1950’s.152 This seems to bear the hallmarks of a new Cold War in the making pegged on a
second space race. The 21st century may well be the ‘Chinese Century’, in which China becomes
the richest, most populous, and most powerful nation on Earth.’153 As America strides along in
the new millennium and a new space race is in the offing, this time, the challenger to the
American super-power is China. Could another Cold War be afoot?
China’s manned space and associate programs will no doubt enable the country to
develop and improve its military applications, including space-based intelligence gathering,
navigation, and guidance, and jamming. Chinese military space programs are driven by security
considerations. ‘… Western analysts point to the fact that the Chinese manned space program has
always been under the command of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] General Armament
Director—Gen. Cao Gangchuan for Shenzhou V and Gen. Chen Bingde for Shenzhou VI. Many
of the programs carried out through the Shenzhou series are suspected of having dual-use
significance, such as the high-resolution imaging system and reconnaissance capabilities.’154 In
2005 a United States Defence Department report on the Chinese military voiced concerns over
China’s space program, pointing out that military capability and strategy ‘is likely one of the
primary drivers behind Beijing’s space endeavours and a critical component’ of the country’s
financial investment in space.155.
In October 2005, during his first-ever visit to China as United States Defence Secretary,
Donald Rumsfeld spent most of his time berating the top brass of the PLA on the excessive
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ambition and lack of transparency in regard to Chinese military modernisation program.156 In
November of the same year, when United States President Bush Jr. visited China, no
breakthroughs were achieved from the much-anticipated summit between Presidents Bush Jr. and
his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao raising doubts as to whether the two ‘strategic competitors’ can
put their common interests ahead of deep-seated differences. In the meantime, Chinese strategic
and military advisers are warily watching new deployments of United States troops and military
installations in Japan following discussions between defence officials from both sides on how to
extend the reach of the U.S.-Japan military alliance in Asia.157

VII. CONCLUSION
The Space Law regime has a schizophrenic quality which exposes a serious internal
contradiction in the Space Law regime. As space technology develops into more sophisticated
areas such as low–earth systems, space planes, and a variety of space–based platforms carrying a
variety of systems, the issue of delimiting the outer space area district from national airspace
should become more immediate. The ‘peaceful’ purposes centrepiece of Space Law does not rule
out the military use of outer space or military use of commercial communications satellites. It
does not prohibit the use of commercial satellite communications in tactical military operations in
which armed force is used. Whether a military use is for ‘peaceful purposes’ cannot be
determined by the type of vehicle on which a satellite terminal is mounted, by the vehicle’s
cargo, by the nature of the communications traffic, or by whether the vehicle or personnel using
the equipment are engaged in military operations involving the use of armed force. Satellite earth
stations need not be ‘turned–off’ merely because the vehicle on which they are mounted are
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engaged in an operation involving the use of armed force. The Space Law regime yields little
information on space warfare.
Several decades after man’s conquest of space, there has not yet been a case of one nation
using force against another in outer space. Nonetheless, given the increasing global reliance on
space systems, and increasing militarization of space, its weaponization and evolution into a
distinct theatre of military operations seems likely. According to one observer, ‘two of every
three launchings of spacecraft serve military purposes’.158 As space technology develops into
more sophisticated areas such as low-earth systems, space planes, and a variety of space-based
platforms carrying a variety of systems, the issue of definitively interpreting ‘peaceful purposes’
assumes urgency. It is difficult to reconcile the objective of ‘development of weapons systems’
and ‘military operations’ with the goal of using space for ‘peaceful purposes for the benefit of all
mankind’.
In the face of rising Chinese Space breakthroughs and accelerating American space
weaponization, it may not be possible to have these two titans agree to a bilateral treaty in the
face of the obvious military utility offered by space. Absent a comprehensive, multilateral
agreement preserving space for peaceful purposes, space remains open to military development.
It is to be remembered that in August 1981, the Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations
Committee on Disarmament a Draft Treaty on the Stationing of Weapons of any Kind in Outer
Space.159 The draft treaty sought to ban deployment of all types of weapons in outer space and to
provide for the use of national technical monitoring facilities. Its revival would provide a focal
point for states to negotiate a comprehensive multilateral treaty to address the weaponization of
outer space considering that the United States withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and its policy to
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contain China as a peer competitor all but rules out a bilateral treaty between the two titans. In
any case China is unlikely to agree to a treaty that constrains its rapidly budding space program,
but preserves the technological edge that the United States already enjoys.

39

